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CONTRACT AND PROPERTY LAW—FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES AND 
LANDLORD-TENANT LAW—A CALL FOR THE REPEAL OF THE ENGLISH 
RULE “LOSER PAYS” SYSTEM REGARDING CONTRACT DISPUTES AND ITS 
EFFECT ON LOW-INCOME ARKANSAS TENANTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In October of 2012, Petrice Howard noticed water leaking in her 
daughter’s bedroom.1 This leak would be followed by an infestation of black 
mold that spanned the surfaces of the bedroom before spreading to the rest 
of the house.2 Her landlord refused to do anything to fix the problem, and 
when Petrice reported the issue to code enforcement, the landlord claimed 
that she had breached her contract and proceeded to evict her.3 Though this 
situation is bad enough on its own, in Arkansas, if Petrice chose to fight her 
landlord’s claim of breach of contract, she might face the additional burden 
of having to pay for her landlord’s attorney’s fees due to Arkansas’s adop-
tion of an English Rule statute for breach of contract cases. 
The “American Rule,” which requires the parties involved to inde-
pendently bear the cost of their individual attorney’s fees regardless of the 
outcome of the case, has reigned supreme in American jurisprudence since 
its founding, despite many attempts to replace it with the cost-shifting “Eng-
lish Rule” that awards attorney costs to a prevailing party.4 In the face of 
these attempts to overthrow the American Rule, the Supreme Court of the 
United States has routinely held that individuals should pay their own attor-
ney’s fees, with few exceptions, for three major policy reasons: (1) to keep 
courts accessible to all persons, including low-income individuals; (2) to 
reduce the burden on courts in having to determine awards of attorney’s 
fees; and (3) to prevent penalization of individuals for asserting claims or 
defenses in court, because the outcome of litigation cannot be known in ad-
vance.5 
 
 1. Cheree Franco, No Rights for Tenants in Arkansas: Study Panel Wants Landlords to 
Fix Properties, End Retaliatory Eviction, ARK. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.arktimes. 
com/arkansas/no-rights-for-tenants-inarkansas/Content?oid=2681818. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See, e.g., Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015); Ar-
cambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306, 306 (1796). 
 5. David Schoen, Attorney Fees-United States is Not Liable for Attorney Fees under 
the Equal Access to Justice Act by Analogy to Section 1983, 8 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 
61, 64 (1985) (citing Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier, 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967)). 
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This note explores how adoption of the English Rule’s “loser pays” 
statute makes enforcing contracts more difficult for Arkansas tenants seek-
ing to dispute their lease agreements, and calls for the adoption of either the 
American Rule or a hybrid rule that will help protect low-income tenants’ 
access to the judicial system. Part II briefly explores the historical back-
ground of the English and American Rules. Part III explains the current po-
sition of tenant rights in Arkansas under the Arkansas Residential Landlord-
Tenant Act of 2007 and explains how this Act places several hurdles in the 
path of tenants, particularly low-income tenants, in seeking the aid of the 
judicial system. Part IV illustrates that the English Rule creates another un-
necessary hurdle for low-income individuals, specifically low-income Ar-
kansas tenants, seeking to enforce their lease agreements. Part V explores 
how the English Rule creates an unnecessary burden on the judicial system 
in determining who constitutes a prevailing party and the amount of reason-
able attorney fees he or she deserves. Part VI calls for repeal of Arkansas 
Code Annotated section 16-22-308, and for the legislature to adopt a limited 
fee-shifting statute favoring prevailing plaintiffs. Finally, Part VII concludes 
this note. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The History of the English Rule and the American Rule in the United 
States 
When a case concludes, courts will either apply the English Rule, 
which states that the prevailing party should be awarded reasonable attorney 
fees by the court, or the American Rule in which each party pays their own 
attorney fees.6 The English “loser pays” rule dates back as early as the Ro-
man era.7 After two decades of American jurisprudence, the federal court 
system adopted and maintained a steadfast adherence to the American Rule.8 
Courts have maintained a strict observance of the American Rule, recogniz-
ing departures from this standard only in cases involving explicit statutory 
exceptions, cases involving common funds, or cases involving bad faith.9 
 
 6. Jacob Singer, Bad Faith Fee-Shifting in Federal Courts: What Conduct Qualifies?, 
84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 693, 695 (2010). 
 7. Id.; Buffy D. Lord, Dispute Resolution on the High Seas: Aspects of Maritime Arbi-
tration, 8 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 71, 86 n.109 (2002) (“The tradition of awarding attorney’s 
fees and costs can be traced to Roman law in which the losing party was required to pay the 
prevailing party’s costs.”). 
 8. Arcambel, 3 U.S. at 306 (holding that the “general practice of the United States is in 
opposition to [adopting the English Rule]”). 
 9. See, e.g., Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 
49, 65 (1993); Tr. of the Internal Improvement Fund of Florida v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 
536 (1881); see also Schoen, supra note 5, at 65; M. Brinkley Morse, Attorney’s Fees – 
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Generally, any attempt to convert to an English Rule system received 
little support.10 The real threat came in 1994 when Newt Gingrich brought 
forth the Republican “Contract With America.”11 Part of this contract was 
the “Common Sense Legal Reform Act,” which switched from the Ameri-
can Rule to the English Rule for all actions arising under state law but 
brought in federal courts under diversity jurisdiction.12 After significant 
backlash to the adoption of the English Rule, the legislature backtracked and 
limited the scope of the English Rule in the Attorney Accountability Act of 
1995.13 
B. The History of the English Rule and the American Rule in Arkansas 
While Arkansas generally follows the American Rule, during the Re-
publican “Contract With America,” Arkansas adopted the English Rule for 
civil lawsuits concerning contract disputes in Arkansas Code Annotated 
section 16-22-308. The statute reads: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, statement of account, 
account stated, promissory note, bill, negotiable instrument, or contract 
relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, or for 
labor or services, or breach of contract, unless otherwise provided by law 
or the contract which is the subject matter of the action, the prevailing 
party may be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be assessed by the 
court and collected as costs.
14
 
The statute has remained essentially the same over the last twenty-four 
years and covers any lawsuit in which a contractual dispute is in question.15 
 
Nemeroff v. Abelson and the Bad Faith Exception to the American Rule, 58 TUL. L. REV. 
1519, 1522 (1984). Additionally, in June 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States re-
newed its dedication to the American Rule, holding that “[w]e . . . will not deviate from the 
American Rule ‘absent explicit statutory authority.’” Baker Botts L.L.P., 135 S. Ct. at 2164. 
 10. See Edward F. Sherman, From “Loser Pays” to Modified Offer of Judgment Rules: 
Reconciling Incentives to Settle with Access to Justice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1863 (1998); Morse, 
supra note 9, at 1522–23. 
 11. NEWT GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT 
GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 145–46 
(1994). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Attorney Accountability Act of 1995, H.R. 988, 104th Cong. (1995). The Attorney 
Accountability Act of 1995 limits the awarding of attorney’s fees to two situations: (1) an 
injured party may recover reasonable attorney’s fees when there has been a violation of Rule 
11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) an offeror of a rejected settlement 
agreement may recover reasonable attorney’s fees from the time of the rejection of the offer 
if the outcome of the case is not more favorable to the offeree than the settlement offer. Id. §§ 
2, 4. 
 14. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 1999). 
 15. See id. 
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Arkansas courts have held that the statute applies to basic business contrac-
tual disputes for the sale of land and bankruptcy claims.16 However, in cases 
that include multiple claims, where only one or some of the claims are ac-
tionable claims under the statute, the actionable claim must be primarily 
based in contract.17 Additionally, when a party seeks specific performance, 
the statute does not apply.18 
C.   The Legal Services Corporation Helps Cover the Cost of Litigation for 
Low-Income Individuals 
Despite providing a more balanced and consistent experience for the 
parties, the American Rule does not entirely solve the problem of limited 
access to the courts for low-income individuals due to a lack of money. 
While some argue that the American Rule relieves some of the burden that 
the English Rule places on courts, it does not alleviate the barriers placed in 
the way of low-income individuals seeking access to courts.19  
In response to this issue, Congress created the Legal Services Corpora-
tion (LSC) in 1974 to provide subsidies to cover the costs of court for eligi-
ble low-income individuals.20 LSC does not attempt to promote “socially 
useful litigation,” but rather seeks to “achieve equal access to the system of 
justice for the poor.”21 LSC continues to fund a significant portion of the 
legal aid offered around the country.22 However, the LSC is underfunded 
and unable to help many people in need, despite its attempts to remove the 
barriers between low-income individuals and courts.23 Because of this, many 
low-income individuals still lack access to the court system that holds the 
potential justice they desire. 
 
 16. See Beck v. Inter City Transp., Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 370, at 8, 417 S.W.3d 740, 745; 
Curry v. Thornsberry, 81 Ark. App. 112, 121, 98 S.W.3d 477, 483 (2003). 
 17. Barringer v. Hall, 89 Ark. App. 293, 305, 202 S.W.3d 568, 575 (2005). 
 18. Ouachita Trek & Dev. Co. v. Rowe, 341 Ark. 456, 466, 17 S.W.3d 491, 497 (2000). 
 19. See generally Calvin A. Kuenzel, Attorneys’ Fees in a Responsible Society, 14 
STETSON L. REV. 283 (1985); Phyllis A. Monroe, Comment, Financial Barriers to Litigation: 
Attorney Fees and the Problem of Legal Access, 46 ALB. L. REV. 148 (1981); Philip J. Mause, 
Winner Takes All: A Re-examination of the Indemnity System, 55 IOWA L. REV. 26 (1969); 
James H. Creek III, Note, Attorney’s Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. 
L. REV. 1216 (1967); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great 
Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792 (1966). 
 20. See Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat 378 (1974) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1982)). 
 21. Note, Fee Simple: A Proposal to Adopt a Two-Way Fee Shift for Low-Income Liti-
gants, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1232 (1988). 
 22. See How We Work, LEGAL SERS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/what-legal-aid/how-we-
work (last visited Jan. 17, 2017). 
 23. Note, supra note 21, at 1232. 
2016] ARKANSAS LANDLORD-TENANT LAW 109 
III. THE ARKANSAS RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT ACT OF 2007 
The Arkansas legislature drafted the Arkansas Residential Landlord-
Tenant Act of 2007 (hereafter abbreviated as “the Act”) based on the Uni-
form Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA).24 When Arkansas 
adopted the URLTA it removed every provision favorable to tenants.25 In 
2009, the Arkansas General Assembly put forth a series of amendments; 
however, these amendments did little to correct the lack of protections and 
remedies for tenants, because the changes made were “essentially corrective 
rather than substantive.”26 
A. The Arkansas Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007 Does Not Pro-
vide a Remedy for Tenants 
As the Act stands today, remedies for frivolous claims remain one-
sided, providing relief for landlords, but not for tenants.27 In fact, the Act 
dedicates an entire subchapter to remedies specifically for landlords, and 
fails to provide remedies for tenants at all.28 Specifically, Arkansas Code 
Annotated sections 18-17-701 and 18-17-702 grant the landlord access to 
remedies when the tenant does not comply with the rental agreement.29 
There is no protection in place for tenants, outside of contract law, if the 
landlord does not comply with the rental agreement. 
Likewise, Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-17-705, titled “Land-
lord and tenant remedies for abuse of access,” does not actually provide for 
any tenant remedies, once again limiting the tenant to breach of contract 
claims.30 Similarly, under the Act’s subchapter for Landlord Obligations, 
there is only one statute, which solely covers security deposits.31 Converse-
ly, the Tenant Obligations under the Act include “maintaining the dwelling 
unit,” providing access to the landlord, and delineating the ways in which a 
tenant may use or occupy the property.32 Therefore, the Act makes the pos-
sibility of tenant noncompliance significantly higher than it does for land-
lords. 
 
 24. See Marshall Prettyman, The Landlord Protection Act, Arkansas Code § 18-17-101 
Et Seq., 2008 ARK. L. NOTES 71, 72 (2008). 
 25. See id. 
 26. Marshall Prettyman, Landlord Protection Law Revisited: The Amendments to the 
Arkansas Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 18-17-101 Et Seq., 35 
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1031, 1039 (2013). 
 27. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-17-101 to -913 (Repl. 2015). 
 28. See id. §§ 18-17-701 to -707. 
 29. Id. §§ 18-17-701, -702. 
 30. Id. § 18-17-705 (emphasis added). 
 31. Id. § 18-17-501. 
 32. See id. §§ 18-17-601 to -603. 
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B.    Under Current Arkansas Property Law, Residential Tenants Remain 
Less Protected than Commercial Tenants 
The Arkansas Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007 applies almost 
exclusively to residential leases, as the name suggests. Only a single provi-
sion in the Act looks at commercial leases.33 Notably, in the statute regard-
ing commercial leases, the court can set the amount of rent due if the land-
lord and the tenant disagree on the amount.34 Yet, in the mirror statute ap-
plying only to residential leases, the court does not have this authority, and 
the tenant must pay “all rent allegedly owed” while the dispute remains on-
going.35 
C.  The Arkansas Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007, Combined 
with the Lack of an Implied Warranty of Habitability in Arkansas, Fails 
to Provide Tenants with any Relief or Remedies to Enforce Their Lease 
Agreements 
Not only does Arkansas fail to explicitly protect tenants, it fails to pro-
tect tenants implicitly as well. Arkansas is the only state in the country that 
has not adopted an implied warranty of habitability or an equivalent duty to 
repair for landlords.36
 
In fact, Arkansas protects landlords from having to 
maintain the dwellings that they rent out.37 Every other state requires, at a 
minimum, that the landlord ensure that the leased premises are habitable for 
the duration of the lease.38 
In 1969, the Supreme Court of Hawai’i became the first state to adopt 
the implied warranty of habitability, overturning the policy of caveat emptor 
 
 33. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-912 (Repl. 2015). 
 34. Id. § 18-17-912(b). 
 35. Id. § 18-17-706(2) (Repl. 2015). 
 36. See NON-LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON THE STUDY OF LANDLORD-TENANT LAWS, 
REPORT TO GOVERNOR MIKE BEEBE 19 (2012). 
 37. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-110 (Repl. 2015) (“No landlord or agent or employee of a 
landlord shall be liable to a tenant or a tenant’s licensee or invitee for death, personal injury, 
or property damages proximately caused by any defect or disrepair on the premises absent the 
landlord’s: (1) Agreement supported by consideration or assumption by conduct of a duty to 
undertake an obligation to maintain or repair the leased premises; and (2) Failure to perform 
the agreement or assumed duty in a reasonable manner.”). 
 38. See NON-LEGISLATIVE COMISSION ON THE STUDY OF LANDLORD-TENANT LAWS, 
supra note 36; Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470, 473 (Ha. 1969); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 
791, 796 (Iowa 1972); Marini v. Ireland, 265 A.2d 526, 533–34 (N.J. 1970); see also, Jamie 
M. Powers, Oklahoma Landlords Beware: Miller v. David Grace, Inc. Abandons Caveat 
Emptor in Residential Leases, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 361, 365 (2011); Michael J. Davis & Phillip 
E. DeLaTorre, A Fresh Look at Premises Liability as Affected by the Warranty of Habitabil-
ity, 59 WASH. L. REV. 141, 155–57 (1984). 
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and holding that leased premises needed to be safe for “human habitation.”39 
In 1972, the Supreme Court of Iowa took this implied warranty a step fur-
ther, requiring landlords to warrant that “there are no latent defects in facili-
ties and utilities vital to the use of the premises for residential purposes and 
these essential features shall remain during the entire term in such condition 
to maintain the habitability of the dwelling.”40 Despite the rapid adoption of 
this implied warranty of habitability that began in the 1960s, Arkansas re-
mains the sole state to not apply this warranty or an equivalent duty to land-
lords.41 
With the lack of either an implied warranty of habitability or statutory 
protections for tenants, many common remedies are not available to tenants 
in a dispute against their landlord in Arkansas.42 In fact, if a tenant in Arkan-
sas attempts to withhold rent, or uses their rent money to fix instead the 
condition that is rendering the leased premises uninhabitable, then that ten-
ant runs the risk of being criminally prosecuted under Arkansas’s failure to 
vacate statute.43 Essentially, while being the only state to not provide some 
level of protection for tenants under the implied warranty of habitability, 
Arkansas is also the only state to criminalize the non-payment of rent.44 
D. Arkansas Offers No Statutory Protections to Tenants, Forcing Them to 
Enforce the Lease Agreement Under Contract Law 
Arkansas tenants are not provided any relief or remedies to enforce 
their lease agreements under either the implied warranty of habitability or 
the Arkansas Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007. Moreover, as illus-
trated above, Arkansas tenants are particularly vulnerable as they are offered 
none of the statutory protections afforded to tenants in most other states. 
 
 39. Lemle, 462 P.2d at 474. 
 40. Mease, 200 N.W.2d at 796. 
 41. See NON-LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON THE STUDY OF LANDLORD-TENANT LAWS, 
supra note 36. 
 42. See Thomas E. Martin, Jr., Common Law Residential Rent Withholding-A Call for 
Legislative Action, 79 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 72, 74–76 (2008) (exploring the ability of tenants to 
withhold rent when the landlord violates the implied warranty of habitability); Michael G. 
Walsh, Advising Your Client on the Tenant’s “Repair and Deduct” Remedy when the Repair 
and Deduct Remedy Is Available, It Can Be a Powerful Form of Self-Help for the Tenant., 
PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., Sept. 2005, at 11 (looking at tenants’ ability to repair the property 
themselves and then deduct the cost of repair from their rent payments); Richard M. Frome 
et. al., Tenant Remedies: An Oxymoron, PROB. & PROP., Jan.–Feb. 1998, at 39, 39–40 (pro-
vides an overview of the various remedies available to tenants when the landlord breaches the 
lease agreement). 
 43. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101 (Repl. 2015). 
 44. Lynn Foster, The Hands of the State: The Failure to Vacate Statute and Residential 
Tenants’ Rights in Arkansas, 36 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 2 (2013). 
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Therefore, a tenant’s remaining option is to enforce the lease agreement 
under contract law. 
IV. THE ENGLISH RULE CONSTRUCTIVELY BARS LOW-INCOME TENANTS’ 
ACCESS TO COURTS 
Access to courts is an imperative right of every individual.45 This ac-
cess allows a litigant to present his or her case and to seek justice, 
“provid[ing] the essential confirmation that our legal rights are real, mean-
ingful, and enduring.”46 Constructively prohibiting access to courts renders 
these legal rights meaningless to those who are unable to afford it. Access to 
the legal system is often more imperative for low-income individuals be-
cause they use the legal system to obtain the basic necessities of life includ-
ing “food, clothing, or shelter.”47 Additionally, low-income individuals often 
wield little political clout, and therefore, must rely on courts to “address 
their needs.”48 
Under Arkansas law, a court’s award of reasonable attorney’s fees to 
the prevailing party is both permissive and discretionary, making litigation 
even more uncertain.49 As previously stated, the amount awarded to prevail-
ing parties is left to the discretion of the presiding court, meaning that any 
party bringing forth or defending a claim does so in an extremely precarious 
position.50 For low-income individuals seeking to enforce their agreements, 
this level of uncertainty can serve as a strong deterrent against bringing 
claims to court. 
The danger of barring low-income individual’s access to courts influ-
enced the Supreme Court of the United States’s decision to adopt, and its 
continued use of, the American Rule.51 In Farmer v. Arabian American Oil 
Co., Justice Goldberg stated that “[i]t has not been accident that the Ameri-
can litigant must bear his own cost of counsel and other trial expense save 
for minimal court costs, but a deliberate choice to ensure that access to 
 
 45. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The very essence of civil liberty 
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenev-
er he receives an injury.”). 
 46. Note, supra note 21, at 1236. 
 47. Note, supra note 21, at 1236; Hiram E. Smith and Fred Marr, Poor People Without 
Lawyers Have No Enforceable Legal Rights: The Future of Legal Services, 13 LINCOLN L. 
REV. 39, 65 (1982). 
 48. Note, supra note 21, at 1237. 
 49. See Worley v. City of Jonesboro, 2011 Ark. App. 594, at 18, 385 S.W.3d 908, 919. 
 50. See River Valley Land, Inc. v. Hudson, 2009 Ark. App. 600, at 4–5, 347 S.W.3d 40, 
43–44. 
 51. See Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 237 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring), disapproved of on other grounds by Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 
U.S. 437 (1987). 
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courts be not effectively denied those of moderate means.”52 In this way, the 
Court anticipated the potential of the English Rule to constructively bar ac-
cess to the judicial system. 
Low-income tenants in Arkansas are particularly situated to be harmed 
by the application of an English Rule statute. As previously explained, ten-
ants in Arkansas do not possess any remedies under the Arkansas Residen-
tial Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007, nor do they have the protection of an im-
plied warranty of habitability. Therefore, the only remaining channel for 
tenants is bringing a breach of contract claim under the provisions of their 
leases. Currently, there are very few cases in Arkansas state courts where 
either a tenant or a landowner brought forth a claim that falls under Arkan-
sas Code Annotated section 16-22-308.53 Notably, the few published cases 
involving a claim by a landlord or a tenant under this statute involve parties 
that are not low-income individuals.54 The lack of case law demonstrates 
that this form of relief is insufficient because low-income individuals are 
unlikely to bring their claims to court under an English Rule statute. 
Arkansas courts have recognized that disputes arising under contracts 
for the sale of land are breach of contract claims for the purpose of Arkansas 
Code Annotated section 16-22-308.55 Likewise, the Arkansas courts have 
recognized a lease agreement dispute as a breach of contract case under the 
statute.56 Under the current law and interpretation of the statute, Arkansas 
courts would place a lease dispute under Arkansas Code Annotated section 
16-22-308, which subjects the “losing” party to paying the attorney’s fees 
for the winning party.57 
The inherent uncertainty of litigation, combined with the vast discrep-
ancies in what constitutes “reasonable” attorney fees, creates a perfect envi-
ronment to scare away low-income tenants from bringing valid complaints 
to court. According to the 2015 Census report, 43.1 million people in Amer-
ica were living in poverty.58 There is a significant percentage of the popula-
tion that remains constructively barred from courts, and the justice these 
courts represent, due to the poverty they live in. 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Notes of Decisions to ARK. CODE ANN. 16-22-308 (Westlaw through Act 4 of 
the 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
 54. See id. 
 55. See, e.g., Armstrong Remodeling & Constr., LLC v. Cardenas, 2012 Ark. App. 387, 
at 13–14, 417 S.W.3d 748, 757. 
 56. See, e.g., River Valley Land, Inc. v. Hudson, 2009 Ark. App. 600, at 9–10, 347 
S.W.3d 40, 45. 
 57. See id. 
 58. United States Census Bureau, Income and Poverty in the United States: 2015, 
http://www.census.gov/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-256.html (last visited Jan 17, 
2017). 
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V. THE ENGLISH RULE BURDENS COURTS 
The adoption of the English Rule in breach of contract cases creates 
additional work for an already burdened judicial system.59 To award attor-
ney’s fees, courts must determine (a) when a claim has been adjudicated, (b) 
who the prevailing party is, and (c) what constitutes “reasonable fees.”60 
Each of these questions requires significant litigation on its own and is in-
credibly fact-intensive.61 
A.   Both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas Have Held that, to Determine Who the Prevailing Party Is, 
There Must Be Adjudication on the Merits of Issues Central to the Liti-
gation 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas has held that in order to even begin to 
determine the prevailing party, there must be “an adjudication on the merits 
of issues central to the litigation.”62 Courts frequently disagree as to what 
constitutes adjudication on the merits. The Supreme Court of the United 
States has held that adjudication on the merits occurs where litigation results 
in a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.”63 In deter-
mining what constitutes a “material alteration,” the Court has held that cir-
cumstances such as enforced settlement agreements, consent decrees, and 
full trials complete with a jury decision are “material alterations,” as they 
represent “court-ordered change[s] in the legal relationship between the 
plaintiff and the defendant.”64 
The Court recognizes a separate “catalyst theory,” which awards attor-
ney’s fees even if there has been “no judicially sanctioned change in the 
legal relationship of the parties.”65 Specifically, the catalyst theory allows 
for a party to be named the prevailing party for the purposes of determining 
the award of attorney’s fees if they were the “‘catalyst’ that triggered a fa-
 
 59. Jacob K. DeYoung, Comment, Rule 4.7 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure: A Squandered Opportunity or a Step in the Right Direction?, 67 ARK. L. REV. 147, 147 
(2014). 
 60. See BKD, LLP v. Yates, 367 Ark. 391, 394–95, 240 S.W.3d 588, 591–92 (2006). 
 61. See Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717–18 
(1967). 
 62. BKD, LLP, 367 Ark. at 395, 240 S.W.3d at 592. 
 63. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 604 (2001) (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 
U.S. 782, 792–93 (1989)). 
 64. Id. (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 792). 
 65. Id. at 605. 
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vorable outcome.”66 The Court has remained hesitant to use the catalyst the-
ory, however, because this theory would allow for recovery of attorney’s 
fees, even if a plaintiff merely “established that the complaint had sufficient 
merit to withstand a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or failure to 
state a claim on which relief may be granted.”67 Despite this, the court has 
yet to repudiate the catalyst theory, and has in fact gone so far as to name a 
plaintiff that has received only nominal damages the prevailing party in a 
claim.68 
Arkansas courts have adopted the Supreme Court’s stance requiring a 
material change in the legal relationship between the parties. In Perry v. 
Baptist Health, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that in order to deter-
mine who is the prevailing party, the court must determine “which party, if 
any, prevailed on the merits of the case as a whole.”69 While the Supreme 
Court of the United States was willing to recognize a settlement as adjudica-
tion on the merits70, the Arkansas Court of Appeals has held that adjudica-
tion on the merits does not, in fact, include summary judgments.71 
Consequently, courts must go through a rigorous and fact-intensive 
analysis of each individual case to determine which claims involved, if any, 
were adjudicated on the merits.72 Without this process, there is no way that 
the court could possibly determine who the prevailing party is. In order to 
determine who pays, the courts must take pains to determine who the pre-
vailing party is. Therefore, this first step in determining who pays, and how 
they much that party pays, places a large burden on courts that would be 
relieved by the adoption of the American Rule in breach of contract cases. 
B. Both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas Broadly Interpret Who the Prevailing Party Is in Regards to 
Awarding Attorney’s Fees 
The Supreme Court of the United States has broadly interpreted “pre-
vailing party” in regards to awarding attorney’s fees. In Farrar v. Hobby, 
the Court held that, for the purposes of awarding attorney’s fees under fee-
shifting statutes, a prevailing party is one that “succeed[s] on any significant 
issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit [that party] sought in 
 
 66. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 
194–195 (2000). 
 67. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605. 
 68. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 194. 
 69. 368 Ark. 114, 120–21, 243 S.W.3d 310, 316 (2006). 
 70. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 123 (1980). 
 71. Beckworth v. Diamante, a Private Membership Golf Club, LLC, 2010 Ark. App. 
814, at 14–15, 379 S.W.3d 752, 762. 
 72. See BKD, LLP v. Yates, 367 Ark. 391, 393–94, 240 S.W.3d 588, 590–91 (2006). 
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bringing suit.”73 Likewise, in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia Department of Health & Human Resources, the Court held that a 
“‘prevailing party’ is one who has been awarded some relief by the court.”74 
Arkansas has adopted a similarly broad interpretation of “prevailing 
party” when determining the award of attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court 
of Arkansas requires that courts explore the case as a whole and “analyz[e] 
each cause of action and its subsequent outcome” to determine whether 
there was a prevailing party.75 
Additionally, courts have held that Arkansas Code Annotated section 
16-22-308 applies mainly to breach of contract and other contractual dispute 
cases; therefore, in order to be the prevailing party in a case that includes a 
miscellaneous claim and a breach of contract claim, the party only needs to 
prevail on the contract claim.76 The Arkansas Court of Appeals has held that 
“[w]here both contract and tort claims are advanced, an attorney fee award 
is proper only when the action is primarily based in contract.”77 
For example, in Baptist Health v. Smith, a physician who lost on his 
claim for indemnity against a vascular surgery center and its president, but 
prevailed on his counterclaim for breach of contract, was found to be the 
prevailing party simply because he prevailed on the contract claim.78 Like-
wise, in Spann v. Lovett & Co., Ltd., the Supreme Court of Arkansas held 
that a buyer who lost on his claims of fraud, reimbursement, and tortious 
interference, but prevailed on his breach of contract claim, was the prevail-
ing party for the purpose of awarding attorney’s fees.79 
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Arkansas has held that the amounts 
won by each party are not indicative of whether or not the party prevailed in 
the end.80 Rather, it held that the prevailing party is “determined by who 
comes out ‘on top’ at the end of the case.”81 In Larco Inc. v. Strebeck, the 
court held that not receiving all of the damages an employee originally 
sought in his suit was not enough to say that he did not prevail.82 
Therefore, what constitutes a “prevailing party” for the sake of deter-
mining attorney’s fees does not necessarily mean that the party truly pre-
vailed in terms of the full impact of the claims brought forth. This relaxed 
view of which party prevailed for the sake of attorney’s fees means that par-
 
 73. 506 U.S. 103, 109 (1992) (citations omitted). 
 74. 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001). 
 75. BKD, LLP, 367 Ark. at 394, 240 S.W.3d at 591. 
 76. See Baptist Health v. Smith, 536 F.3d 869, 873 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 77. Barringer v. Hall, 89 Ark. App. 293, 305, 202 S.W.3d 568, 576 (2005). 
 78. 536 F.3d at 873. 
 79. 2012 Ark. App. 107, at 23–24, 389 S.W.3d 77, 94–95. 
 80. Marcum v. Wengart, 344 Ark. 153, 162, 40 S.W.3d 230, 236 (2001). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Larco, Inc. v. Strebeck, 2010 Ark. App. 263, at 8, 379 S.W.3d 16, 22. 
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ties may actually end up being rewarded for poor behavior. Moreover, even 
if a party were to prevail on all aspects of a case, this is not indicative of the 
party deserving attorney’s fees. As Judge Gibson once said: “it is a fallacy 
to suppose that every successful plaintiff has a right to be made whole by a 
verdict which is, at best, only an approximation [of] perfect justice.”83 
C. Arkansas Courts Use Seven Factors to Determine What Constitutes 
Reasonable Attorney’s Fees, but These Factors Are Merely a Guide, 
Rather than a Fixed Test 
Arkansas state courts have routinely held that there is no “fixed” test to 
determine what constitutes reasonable attorney’s fees.84 Instead courts will 
be guided by the following seven factors in making their decision: 
(1) the experience and ability of the attorney; (2) the time and labor re-
quired to perform the service properly; (3) the amount in controversy and 
the result obtained in the case; (3) the novelty and difficulty of the issues 
involved; (4) the fee customarily charged for similar services in the local 
area; (5) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (6) the time limitations 
imposed upon the client in the circumstances; and (7) the likelihood, if 
apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment 
will preclude other employment by the attorney.
85
 
In using these factors to “guide” their decision, courts are not required 
to look at each factor, or even discuss the various factors, when they report 
the fees that the losing party is required to pay.86 This lack of transparency 
can create even more confusion for litigants bringing suits, as they are left in 
the dark about how much the other party’s attorney’s fees are going to be, 
should they not prevail. 
Determining what constitutes the reasonableness of fees often induces 
a significant burden on courts.87 As the Supreme Court of the United States 
stated: “the time, expense, and difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the 
question of what constitutes reasonable attorney’s fees would pose substan-
tial burdens for judicial administration.”88 This has certainly been true, and 
this confusion is not aided by the fact that Arkansas state courts and the fed-
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 84. See, e.g., Newcourt Fin., Inc. v. Canal Ins. Co., 341 Ark. 452, 454–55, 17 S.W.3d 
83, 84–85 (2000) (per curiam); Chrisco v. Sun Indus., Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 229, 800 S.W.2d 
717, 718–19 (1990). 
 85. Phi Kappa Tau Hous. Corp. v. Wengert, 350 Ark. 335, 341, 86 S.W.3d 856, 860 
(2002). 
 86. See, e.g., Millwood-RAB Mktg., Inc. v. Blackburn, 95 Ark. App. 253, 261–62, 236 
S.W.3d 551, 557–58 (2006). 
 87. See Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967). 
 88. Id. at 718. 
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eral courts look at different factors to assess whether a fee is reasonable or 
not.89 
Moreover, despite this factor test, the decision of what constitutes “rea-
sonable attorney fees” remains highly subjective. Arkansas courts have held 
that even the determination of the “amount of award” to be granted to the 
prevailing party is an entirely discretionary determination that will only be 
reversed on appeal if there was an abuse of discretion.90 The Arkansas Court 
of Appeals went on to confirm the discretionary nature of the amount of the 
fees awarded in a later case, reiterating that “[t]he decision to award attor-
ney’s fees and the amount of the award are discretionary.”91 So while there 
is a “reasonable” requirement to the awards of fees, courts have full discre-
tion on how they define “reasonable.”92 
In contrast to Arkansas’s seven factor guidelines, federal courts gener-
ally use one of two methods of determining attorney’s fees: the twelve fac-
tor test or the “lodestar” method.93 The twelve factors that federal courts 
look at are similar in nature to Arkansas’s seven factors; however, the feder-
al courts also look at the experience of the attorney, the desirability of the 
case in question, the nature and length of the relationship between the client 
and the attorney, and awards granted in similar cases.94 
Overall, the lodestar method has become the more popular method of 
determining reasonable fees and requires only that “[t]he initial estimate of a 
reasonable attorney’s fee is properly calculated by multiplying the number 
of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly 
rate.”95 While seemingly more objective, the lodestar method continues to 
place burdens on courts because the “initial estimate” is increased or de-
creased depending on the twelve Johnson factors.96 
In the end, the reasonableness of the attorney fees awarded creates an 
additional burden on courts because the courts must make the discretionary 
decision on what amount is reasonable in a given case. To determine the 
reasonable amount of the award, courts undergo a fact-intensive analysis of 
the time spent on the case and the regular rates of other attorneys.97 This 
analysis only occurs after the court has already determined which claims the 
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court adjudicated and which party prevailed, illustrating the amount of work 
the English Rule adds to the court system. No wonder England has created 
an entire court system—the taxing court—that is solely responsible for de-
termining these reasonable fees.98 
VI. REPEALING THE ENGLISH RULE AND INSTITUTING A NEW AMERICAN 
RULE 
For the reasons listed thus far, repealing the English Rule would not 
only lessen the burden on courts, but would also help provide a more con-
sistent legal experience for plaintiffs and defendants, while simultaneously 
providing the equal access to courts that American jurisprudence requires. 
Under the American Rule, parties would pay for their individual attorney 
fees.99 Therefore, any party bringing forth or defending a claim would go 
into the case fully aware of the cost of litigation; parties would be able to 
make far more informed decisions as the case continues than they are cur-
rently able to under the more discretionary English Rule. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has explicitly stated that un-
less “specific and explicit provisions for the allowance of attorneys’ fees 
[are found] under [a] selected statute,” the American Rule is to be applied to 
any cause of action.100 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Arkansas has ruled 
that “[t]his court follows the American Rule . . . absent statutory authority or 
a contractual agreement between the parties.”101 Therefore, for Arkansas to 
adopt the American Rule, all that is necessary is for the Arkansas legislature 
to repeal the statutory language authorizing the award of attorney’s fees to 
the prevailing party. No additional statute need be created to apply the 
American Rule for breach of contract cases. 
A. Federal Courts Throughout the United States Have Built in Several 
Common Law Exceptions to the American Rule 
Understanding the problematic nature of frivolous claims, federal 
courts throughout the centuries have built in several common law exceptions 
to the American Rule. First, courts can award attorney’s fees to the party 
whose lawsuit benefits others as well as themselves under the “common 
fund” exception.102 Second, courts may award attorney’s fees to the party 
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who willfully disobeys the court’s orders.103 Third, courts may award attor-
ney’s fees to a party when a suit is brought forth in bad faith.104 Fourth, 
courts may award attorney’s fees if there is explicit statutory language or a 
contractual agreement that authorizes it.105 
While originally created to protect plaintiffs, the English Rule has been 
used to protect defendants as well.106 Similar to the application of the Eng-
lish Rule, a party may gain attorney’s fees under the bad faith exception 
only if they are the prevailing party.107 If a party is found to be the prevailing 
party, particularly the defendant, they then must prove that the other party 
acted in bad faith.108 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit provided the 
definition of bad faith often used in fee-shifting cases: “An action is brought 
in bad faith when the claim is entirely without color and has been asserted 
wantonly, for purposes of harassment or delay, or for other improper rea-
sons.”109 In order to proceed, courts must determine (a) whether there was a 
reasonable basis for the claim, and then determine (b) whether the party 
brought forth the claim with the subjective state of mind required.110 There-
fore, the common law exception for bad faith protects parties that would 
otherwise be brought into litigation for frivolous and harmful reasons. 
B. The Arkansas Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007 Already Fully 
Protects Landlords from Frivolous Claims 
Arkansas landlords are already fully protected by a number of statutory 
exclusions built into the Arkansas Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007 
that protect the landlord and awards attorney’s fees for willful actions.111 In 
Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-17-701(c)(2), the Act provides that 
landlords may recover reasonable attorney’s fees if the tenant’s “noncompli-
ance [with the eviction for failure to pay rent] is willful” so long as the land-
lord is represented by an attorney.112 Moreover, the Arkansas Code allows 
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for the landlord to collect reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to actual 
damages, if the tenant breaches the lease agreement.113 Similarly, if a tenant 
remains in possession of the leased property in bad faith, then the landlord 
can recover any reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to damages.114 Arkan-
sas Code Annotated section 18-17-705 allows a landlord to collect attor-
ney’s fees if a tenant refuses to allow the landlord lawful access, regardless 
of whether the landlord simply terminates the rental agreement or actually 
obtains injunctive relief in Arkansas district court.115 
As a result, not only do these statutes and several others allow for at-
torney’s fees in nearly every case for landlords, but the Act completely 
omits the right of tenants to obtain any attorney’s fees should they prevail on 
a cause.116 In the one statute, which allows for a judgment in favor of a ten-
ant, there is no mention of attorney’s fees whatsoever.117 
Landlords remain fully protected in regards to the potential expenses of 
having to litigate their cases under the Act without the English Rule. With 
these protections already in hand, the need for an English Rule to protect the 
landlords from frivolous or bad faith claims that may result in expensive 
attorney costs remains unnecessary. 
C. Arkansas Should Recognize a New Exception to the American Rule 
Where Low-Income Individuals Are Immune from Paying Any Attor-
ney’s Fee Awards, as Long as the Action Brought Is Brought in Good 
Faith 
In order to provide the greatest possible access to the court system to 
low-income tenants, Arkansas should institute a new exception to the Amer-
ican Rule that would protect low-income individuals. There have been other 
attempts at creating exceptions that would help weaken the barriers standing 
between low-income individuals and the court system, but these exceptions 
often create new, unresolved issues.118 
Quite frankly, the best way to protect low-income individuals’ access 
to the court system, while simultaneously relieving the burden on courts 
under the American Rule, would be to contact the state legislatures and ask 
for legal aid to receive better funding. LSC is already in place to help re-
move the monetary barrier between low-income individuals and the judicial 
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system, and, with proper funding, it has the possibility of removing this bar-
rier entirely.119 
Additionally, courts could recognize a new qualified exception for 
those cases in which the American Rule does not apply by allowing low-
income individuals to be immune from having to pay attorney’s fee awards 
barring bad-faith exceptions. Litigants seeking to utilize the exception 
would only need to illustrate that, based on income and family size, they 
would normally qualify for aid from LSC. This does not solve the entire 
problem, but certainly adds more security to the process and allows for bet-
ter access to courts by those of “moderate means.”120 
In the unsigned note, Fee Simple: A Proposal to Adopt a Two-Way Fee 
Shift for Low-Income Litigants, the author puts forth the idea that instead of 
the losing party paying the winning party’s attorney fees, the losing attorney 
should pay the assigned attorney’s fees in those instances that the litigant 
meets certain low-income requirements.121 
This idea, however, does not solve the problem of low-income liti-
gants’ access to courts, but merely shifts the barrier instead. While the im-
plementation of this idea would theoretically remove the issue of how low-
income individuals could pay for their attorney, it fails to recognize that 
attorneys themselves would be far more unlikely to take on low-income 
clients if they ran the risk of being personally responsible for the other par-
ty’s attorney’s fees, despite the fact attorneys “must take risks regularly and 
should be better able and more willing than plaintiffs to assume risk.”122 All 
this solution does is redirect the problem that low-income litigants have in 
finding adequate legal presentation to the attorneys themselves, and ulti-
mately fails to solve the problem. This proposed solution allows for the liti-
gants to go to court, but does not allow for the litigants to find a lawyer that 
will go with them. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the policy reasons stated above, adoption of the American Rule 
would result in more equitable litigation and actual contract enforcement, 
while simultaneously limiting the burden on an already burdened court sys-
tem and allowing more equal access to courts for the state’s most needy. 
The Arkansas Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007 leaves tenants with 
no real remedies for disputes with landlords outside of contract enforcement. 
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Arkansas’s adoption of the English Rule for contractual disputes, however, 
constructively denies low-income tenants access to the courts, while simul-
taneously burdening the courts by making them go through fact-intensive 
analyses of whether claims were adjudicated on the merits, who the prevail-
ing parties were, and what constitutes reasonable fees. 
As is evident from the lack of tenants seeking to enforce their lease 
agreements through contract law, there is a segment of the population de-
terred by Arkansas’s adoption of the English Rule. By switching to the 
American Rule, and instituting the new exception, Arkansas would follow 
the rest of the country, and open the doors of the judicial system to every 
citizen, regardless of their means. With the American Rule and this limited 
exception, low-income individuals like Petrice would be able to fight the 
breach of contract claim with more certainty and less fear about later drown-
ing in court costs. 
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